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A Proposal for Early Impact, 
Persistent, and Cost-Effective 
Job Creation Policies
Due to the recession, the U.S. 
economy has lost over 10 million jobs. 
Job creation rarely receives the focus 
it deserves in fi scal stimulus proposals, 
either in the one that has already been 
enacted or in many of the proposals 
currently being considered. 
Job creation deserves greater focus 
because joblessness has large long-run 
economic costs. Because conventional 
fi scal stimulus does not focus on 
job creation—job creation is only a 
byproduct of boosting gross domestic 
product (GDP)—this fi scal stimulus 
is relatively costly per job created. As 
a result, current and proposed fi scal 
stimulus cannot create enough jobs at 
politically acceptable costs to meet the 
current job needs in the United States. If 
we are to suffi ciently address these needs 
without overly adding to the budget 
defi cit, we need to make job creation 
a central goal of a new fi scal stimulus 
package. This package must have a low 
cost per job created, address near-term 
job needs, and have persistent effects 
over the next several years.
Why Creating Jobs Is as Important as 
Generating GDP
Much of the debate over fi scal 
stimulus focuses on GDP multiplier 
effects. The number of jobs created 
receives less attention.
Job creation deserves special focus 
because of the enormous costs of 
joblessness in the long run. Joblessness 
erodes the unemployed’s self-confi dence 
and job skills, and damages their 
reputations with employers. Lengthy 
unemployment reduces a worker’s 
employment rates and wage rates in 
the long run.1 Therefore, combating the 
recession should place a great emphasis 
on creating jobs, not just on boosting 
GDP. The long-run productivity of 
many workers and the economy will be 
enhanced by antirecession policies that 
stress job creation, even if they do not 
have greater effects on GDP. 
The Need for Immediate and Persistent 
Job Creation Policies
If joblessness damages long-run 
economic prospects, then the current 
recession is a disaster with long-run 
consequences. Losing millions of jobs 
not only imposes current pain, it also 
damages long-run economic productivity. 
Since the start of the recession in 
December 2007, the employment-to-
population ratio has dropped from 62.7 
percent to 58.2 percent (as of December 
2009). To restore employment conditions 
to prerecession levels, the economy 
would need an additional 10.7 million 
jobs.
Even though GDP has begun to 
recover, the labor market will likely have 
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large employment defi cits for the next 
several years. In the last two recessions, 
employment-to-population rates did not 
increase from their trough level by more 
than 0.2 percent for more than two and a 
half years after the recovery in GDP had 
begun. If our current recovery in GDP 
began in mid-2009, history suggests that 
the employment-to-population ratio will 
not rise signifi cantly above its current 
level until the beginning of 2012. One 
study fi nds that the U.S. economy will 
be short of 2007 employment rates by 
10.7 million jobs in 2010, 8.5 million 
jobs in 2011, and 5.1 million jobs in 2012 
(Schmitt and Baker 2009). Other analysts 
project that it will be seven years before 
unemployment rates dip below 5 percent 
(Baily 2009; Thoma 2009). 
These employment defi cits are 
occurring despite the $787 billion fi scal 
stimulus package passed in February 
2009. The stimulus package is helping, 
but it is insuffi cient. Estimates from the 
Council of Economic Advisers (2009a, 
2010) suggest that the stimulus has added 
over 1.5 million jobs so far and that it 
may add another 2 million jobs by the 
end of 2010. But the employment defi cit 
numbers given above are after these job 
creation effects. Without the stimulus, we 
would be short even more jobs. 
Targeted Job Creation Policies 
Are More Cost-Effective Than 
Conventional Fiscal Stimulus Policies
These large employment defi cits are 
diffi cult to reduce through conventional 
fi scal stimulus, which focuses on reviving 
demand for goods and services through 
tax cuts or increased public spending. 
Job creation is a by-product of reviving 
demand. More targeted job creation 
policies, which directly increase jobs 
relative to GDP, are much less costly per 
job. 
In the $787 billion fi scal stimulus 
package, the average cost of creating 
one job per year was $112,000. Tax cuts 
are estimated to cost $145,000 per job 
created, state fi scal relief is estimated to 
cost $117,000 per job created, and direct 
federal government spending is estimated 
to cost $92,000 per job created (Council 
of Economic Advisers 2009a). The “Cash 
for Clunkers” program has an estimated 
cost per job created of $86,000 (Council 
of Economic Advisers 2009b). “Cash 
for Caulkers” is estimated to have a cost 
per job created of $80,000 (Hendricks 
et al. 2009). Increases in unemployment 
benefi ts have an estimated cost per job 
created of around $95,000.2 
With costs of about $100,000 per 
job created, it is diffi cult to have a 
conventional fi scal stimulus package 
large enough to signifi cantly reduce 
our employment defi cits.3 Suppose 
we wanted to create 5 million jobs in 
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, which 
would address a little less than half of 
the expected employment defi cits in 
those years. At a cost per job created of 
$100,000, the fi scal stimulus package 
necessary to reach these job goals would 
total another $900 billion. But the new 
fi scal stimulus/job creation packages that 
are thought to be currently politically 
feasible are much smaller. For example, 
in December 2009 the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed by only fi ve 
votes a $154 billion jobs/fi scal stimulus 
package. Perhaps a bigger stimulus 
package can be considered, but a package 
close to the size of the original stimulus 
seems politically implausible. 
Targeted job creation policies are more 
cost-effective than conventional fi scal 
stimulus because these targeted policies 
encourage employers to increase the ratio 
of jobs to GDP. Targeted job creation 
policies are around three times as cost-
effective as conventional fi scal stimulus: 
$35,000 per job versus $100,000. The 
recent Job Creation Tax Credit proposal, 
which would provide employers with a 
wage subsidy for payroll expansions, has 
a gross cost per job created of $29,000 
(Bartik and Bishop 2009). One public 
service jobs program, the Minnesota 
Emergency Employment Development 
program (MEED), has a gross cost per 
job created of $34,000 (Bartik 2009). 
Other public service jobs proposals have 
a gross cost per job created of $40,000 
(Economic Policy Institute 2009). Finally, 
“work sharing” proposals (Abraham 
and Houseman 2009), which encourage 
employers to reduce working hours rather 
than lay off workers, have a gross cost 
per job saved of $32,000 (Baker 2009).   
The net costs of job creation programs 
will be reduced because more jobs and 
greater GDP will increase tax revenues 
and reduce social spending. Targeted 
job creation proposals may have fi scal 
benefi ts of about $20,000 per job created 
(Bartik and Bishop 2009), which reduces 
the net cost to about $15,000 per job 
created. Due to larger effects on GDP, 
conventional fi scal stimulus will have 
larger fi scal benefi ts: $40,000 per job 
created.4 Net costs of conventional fi scal 
stimulus per job created will then be 
around $60,000, but targeted job creation 
is still four times as effective in creating 
jobs, per dollar of net costs. 
Options for a Job Creation Package
A possible stimulus package targeted 
only at job creation could include three 
components: 1) tax credits for employers 
creating jobs, 2) payments to employers 
for work sharing, and 3) public service 
job creation (see Table 1). This package 
would aim to create 5 million jobs in 
2010 and 4 million jobs in 2011, fi lling a 
little less than half of the expected jobs 
defi cit in each year. The gross cost of 
this package, as counted by the Offi ce 
of Management and Budget and the 
Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO), 
would be $276 billion, with a little over 
half of that for 2010. However, after 
accounting for the package’s effects in 
increasing tax revenue and reducing 
social spending, the net cost of this two-
year package would be only $108 billion. 
The gross cost per job created is around 
$30,000; the net cost is about $12,000. 
Compared to the original fi scal 
stimulus of $787 billion, this job creation 
stimulus would have a gross cost only 
one-third as much. However, it would 
create 9 million “job-years” (5 million 
in 2010, 4 million in 2011)—about 
one-third greater than the original fi scal 
The current and proposed 
fi scal stimulus plans cannot 
create enough jobs at 
politically acceptable costs 
to meet the current job 
needs in the United States.
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stimulus’s estimated effect of creating 6.8 
million “job-years.” (One job created for 
one year is one “job-year.”) About half 
of the package would be a tax credit for 
employers adding to payroll, one-quarter 
would go to subsidies encouraging 
employers to offer work sharing, and 
one-quarter would go to the creation of 
public service jobs. 
Tax credits for job creation and 
subsidies for work sharing could very 
quickly be put into effect. And contrary 
to some comments (McArdle 2009), 
it is feasible to expand public service 
jobs quite quickly to the 1.1 million 
job slots of this package.5 During the 
Great Depression, the Civil Works 
Administration created 4.3 million jobs 
in two months, and the Works Progress 
Administration created 2.7 million 
jobs within eight months (Kesselman 
1978; Howard 1943). More recently, 
in 1983 MEED created the equivalent 
nationally of 500,000 jobs within six 
months.6 Rapid public service job 
creation is quite feasible if government 
administrators are given strong 
incentives to reach job creation goals in 
a timely fashion. 
What if policymakers want fi scal 
stimulus to also achieve other goals in 
addition to job creation? For example, 
they may also want to extend access 
to unemployment benefi ts or maintain 
state and local public services. A fi scal 
stimulus package can also achieve 
these goals, but only at higher costs 
or some sacrifi ce of job creation. We 
could add $100 billion to the package 
in conventional fi scal stimulus, which 
at $100,000 per job would create about 
1 million jobs. We could then still 
create 9 million jobs if we reduced job 
creation stimulus to $246 billion. The 
fi scal stimulus package would then have 
to be $346 billion to achieve the same 
job creation goals. Alternatively, we 
could keep the overall package at $276 
billion by letting the $100 billion in 
conventional fi scal stimulus replace $100 
billion in targeted job creation stimulus. 
But then the package’s job creation 
would be lowered from 9 million jobs to 
6.7 million jobs.
Policymakers must decide the 
importance of job creation versus other 
goals of fi scal stimulus. If it is important 
to create a signifi cant number of jobs at 
politically feasible costs—and economic 
research suggests that short-term job 
creation is important to long-term 
economic prospects—then targeted job 
creation policies should be a major part 
of any new fi scal stimulus package. 
Notes
1. The long-run loss of earnings due to 
unemployment is at least one-fi fth of the 
short-run effects. For example, displaced 
workers suffer a 25 percent loss of earnings 
in the year of displacement. Ten years later, 
displaced workers still suffer a 6 percent 
earnings loss (Stevens 1997). As another 
example, graduating from college in a year 
with 1 percent higher unemployment initially 
reduces the graduate’s wages by 6 percent. 
Fifteen years later, these unlucky graduates’ 
wages are still 2.5 percent lower (Kahn 
forthcoming). As a fi nal example, when state 
employment declines, about two-thirds of the 
drop is refl ected initially in state residents 
having a lower employment-to-population 
ratio (one-third is refl ected in lower state 
population). After 17 years, the employment-
to-population ratio in the state is still lower, 
by about 25 percent of the initial shock to 
employment (Bartik, 2001, pp. 141–145).
2. This is based on taking the midpoint 
of the CBO’s November 2009 estimates 
that such transfer payments have a GDP 
multiplier somewhere between 0.8 and 2.2. I 
also use the Council of Economic Advisers’ 
estimates (2009a) that a 1 percent increase 
in GDP is needed to induce 1 million new 
jobs. At current GDP levels of $14.2 trillion, 
this implies a GDP per job created fi gure of 
$142,000. Dividing by 1.5 yields $95,000.
3. The reason conventional fi scal stimulus 
measures cost $100,000 per job created can 
be explained intuitively: they only indirectly 
boost job creation by increasing output 
demand. Suppose one dollar of fi scal stimulus 
increases demand for GDP by one dollar (a 
multiplier of 1.0), and that a boost to GDP 
increased job creation by the average ratio of 
GDP to jobs, which is $105,000 (Council of 
Economic Advisers 2009a). Then the cost per 
job created of conventional fi scal stimulus 
would be $105,000. Some conventional 
fi scal stimulus may have multipliers greater 
than 1, which would lower the cost per job 
created. But boosts to GDP during a recession 
may raise GDP by a greater percentage than 
employment by increasing weekly work hours 
and worker productivity per hour. Even with 
fi scal multipliers of 1.5, it is diffi cult for the 
cost per job created to be much less than 
$100,000.
4. Based on CBO data, Bartik and Bishop 
(2009) estimate fi scal benefi ts of 38 percent of 
the GDP boost. If conventional fi scal stimulus 
has a GDP-to-job created ratio of $105,000, 
then fi scal benefi ts per job created will be 38 
NOTE: Gross costs are costs as counted by budget agencies, without allowing for any effects of 
programs on job creation and GDP generation. Net costs allow for estimated increases in jobs 
and GDP and resulting effects on tax revenue and social spending. 
SOURCE: Estimated effects for the Job Creation Tax Credit are from Bartik and Bishop (2009); 
for work sharing, Baker (2009); for public service jobs programs, my unpublished estimates for 
MEED (see Bartik [2009] and references therein).
Effect analyzed Year
Job creation 
tax credit
Job sharing 
tax credit
Public service 
employment Total
Jobs created (millions) 2010 2.8 1.3 0.9 5.0
2011 2.3 0.7 1.0 4.0
Two-year total 5.1 2.0 1.9 9.0
Gross costs ($, billions) 2010 80 43 31 154
2011 67 21 34 122
Two-year total 147 64 65 276
Net costs ($, billions) 2010 13 30 17 60
2011 14 15 19 48
Two-year total 27 45 36 108
Table 1  A Possible Jobs Package
Targeted job creation policies 
are around three times as 
cost effective as conventional 
fi scal stimulus: $35,000 
per job versus $100,000. 
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percent of $105,000, which is around $40,000. 
Targeted job creation proposals have lower 
effects on GDP per job created, which reduces 
their fi scal benefi ts to around $20,000 per job.
5. To create 0.9 million jobs through public 
service jobs requires somewhat more job 
slots. The model assumes some substitution 
of public service job slots for jobs that would 
have been created anyway, as well as some 
multiplier effects of this spending for public 
service jobs.
6. Personal communication between the 
author and former MEED administrators.
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